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THE UNITED NATIONS 
CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF 
THE CHILD AND UNITED STATES 
ABORTION LAW* 
SANFORD J. Fox·· 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The ratification of treaties governing human rights often 
raises the question of whether obligations imposed by the trea-
ty are compatible with the existing domestic law of the ratify-
ing state. One common way of resolving such conflicts is for 
the State to avoid undertaking the inconsistent legal obligation 
by qualifiying its acceptance of the treaty with a reservation, 1 
• Edited by Resbma Shah and Dane Steffenson. 
•• Professor of Law, Boston College, Massachusetts. 
1. See e.g, the United States reservation to The Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, entered into force for 
the United States Feb. 23, 1989 ("[N]othing in the Convention requires or autho-
rizes legislation or other action by the United States of America prohibited by the 
Constitution of the United States as interpreted by the United States.") 92 CONGo 
REc. S.1377 (daily ed. Feb. 19, 1986). The Senate resolution of ratification for the 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights included a similar reservation: "[A]rticle 20 
does not authorize or require legislation or other action by the United States that 
would restrict the right of free speech and association protected by the Constitu-
tion and laws of the United States." 102 CONGo REc. S.4781 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 
1992). 
Some States may reserve, in more general terms, in order to preserve the 
status quo in their societies. For example, the reservation by Indonesia to the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child stated: "The ratification of the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child by the Republic of Indonesia does not imply the accep-
tance of obligations going beyond the constitutional limits nor the acceptance of 
any obligation to introduce any right beyond those prescribed under the Constitu-
tion. United Nations, Secretary-General, Reservations, Declarations and Objections 
Relating to the Convention on the Rights of the Child at 19, U.N. Doc. 
15 
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even when domestic law already provides for resolving such 
conflicts2 Another measure that may be adopted, particularly 
where the treaty provision at issue is cast in general terms, is 
for the ratifying state to include a Declaration or an Under.;. 
standing (RUD) with its acceptance that sets forth an interpre-
tation of the general terms consistent with domestic law on the 
subject.3 
The purpose of this paper is to examine whether any such 
RUDs are called for in the ratification by the United States of 
the 1989 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the 
Child' in order to avoid a conflict between the treaty and do-
mestic U. S. law governing abortions.5 
Several parts of the Convention raise the question of abor-
tion law. These include the Preamble and several of the sub-
stantive provisions. Analysis of these relevant texts, their leg-
islative history, and the manner in which existing States Par-
ties have dealt with the question of the Convention's impact on 
their domestic law relating to termination of pregnancies, all 
lead to the conclusion that the abortion law of the United 
States would be unaffected by ratification of the Convention. 
CRClC/2IRev.2 (1993) [hereinafter Reservations, Declarations, and Objections]. This 
may evoke objections from other State parties who find it difficult to understand 
the scope of the accepted obligations and who believe that such sweeping reserva-
tions generally undermine the integrity of the treaty system. See, e.g., Id. at 31 
(objection by Sweden). 
2. Although the treaty making power under the federal Constitution is exten-
sive, it is generally assumed not to include the power to diminish personal rights 
guaranteed by the Constitution. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (opinion of 
Black, J.); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAw FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE 
UNITED STATES § 302 cmt. b, at 153; L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CON-
STITUTION 137-40 (1972). 
3. See, e.g., The U.S. Understanding to the Civil and Political Covenant (to 
the effect that the right to assigned counsel does not include the right to choose 
such counsel). 13 CONGo REc. S.4781 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992). 
4. GA Res. 44/25, U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 165, 
U.N. Doc. A/44I736 (1989). 
5. See, Roe V. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), reaffd in Planned Parenthood V. 
Casey, 505 U.S. 737, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). 
2
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II. THE TEXT OF THE CONVENTION 
The Convention, approved by the UN General Assembly in 
1989, quickly came into force.6 
The document is composed of a Preamble and three Parts. 
Part I contains forty-one articles which identify and define the 
rights protected by the treaty. Many of these are elaborations 
of provisions found in earlier human rights treaties, tailored to 
the special situation of children.7 Part II concerns the organi-
zation and work of the Committee on the Rights of the Child 
(CRC) to which States Parties submit periodic reports,S while 
Part III contains the "housekeeping" provisions dealing with 
such issues as the deposit of instruments of ratification and 
the time of the Convention would come into force. 
Relevant to the question of the Convention's possible ef-
fects on U.S. abortion law are paragraph 9 of the Preamble 
and two articles in Part I which provide: 
Preamble Paragraph 
Bearing in mind that, as indicated in the Decla-
ration of the Rights of the Child, "the child, by 
reason of his physical and mental immaturity, 
needs special safeguards and care, including 
appropriate legal protection, before as well as 
after birth". 
6. United Nations, Committee on the Rights of the Child: Report on the Sixth 
(Special) Sesswn (Geneva, 5-22 Apr. 1994) Annex I; States which have Ratified or 
Acceded to the Conventwn on the Rights of the Child at 22, Apr. 1994 (158) Annex 
II; Membership of the Committee on the Rights of the Child, Annex III; Status of 
Submisswn Reports by States Parties Under Article 44 of the ConventWn on the 
Rights of the Child, Annex N; List of Documents Issued for the 6th Sesswn of the 
Committee at 6, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/29 (1994) [hereinafter Report on the Sixth Ses-
swn]. As of 1995, the United States has neither signed nor ratified the Conven-
tion. Id .. 
7. See, e.g., Fox & Young, InternatWnal ProtectWn of Children's Right to 
Health: The Medical Screening of Newborns, XI B.C. THIRD WORLD L_J. 1, 13-30 
(1991) (tracing the evolution of the right to health in Article 24). 
8. GA Res. 44125, supra note 4. Articles 43-45 state that the CRC is a body 
of 10 independent experts elected by the States Parties. Id. 
3
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Part I 
Article 1 
For the purposes of the present Convention, a 
child means every human being below the age of 
eighteen years unless, under the law applicable 
to the child, majority is attained earlier. 
Article 6 
1. States Parties recognize that every child has 
the inherent right to life. 
2. States Parties shall ensure to the maximum 
extent possible the survival and development of 
the child. 
The remainder of this paper is primarily a discussion of 
the implications of these provisions for U.S. abortion law, with 
particular emphasis on the trauaux preparatoires of the Con-
vention and the international sources from which these provi-
sions were derived. 
III. THE PREAMBLE 
It is common practice to examine the preamble in the 
process of interpreting a treaty.9 The role of paragraph 9 of 
the Preamble in interpreting the substantive articles of the 
Convention is examined below lO• At this point the issue to be 
addressed is whether preambular paragraph 9 creates a sub-
stantive right. This is a central question since its text includes 
language which appears to extend the protection of interna-
tional law to a child before birth, thereby adopting a pro life 
orientation in conflict with the "choice" position of American 
abortion law. However, an analysis of the preambular text and 
of its legislative history indicates that this is not the case. 
9. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31(1), (20 U.N. Doc. 
AlCONF.39/27 at 289 (1969), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, entered into force Jan. 27, 1980 
(hereinafter Vienna Convention). Article 31 provides that terms in a treaty are to 
be given their ordinary meaning in their context, and that "context" includes the 
preamble. Although the United States has not ratified the Vienna Convention, it 
has recognized it as an authoritative guide to treaty law and practice. See, S. 
ExEc. Doc. L., 92d Cong., 1st Sess., (1971). 
10. See discussion infra part III. B. 
4
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A. THE PREAMBULAR TEXT AS A WHOLE 
The text of the Preamble makes plain that the legal rights 
and duties established by the Convention must be found out-
side the Preamble. As is common practice in international 
instruments, the Preamble of the Convention constitutes a 
catalogue of the reasons the States Parties enter into the mul-
tilateral agreement. The agreement - the statements of 
children's rights and of States Parties' duties - is contained in 
the text of Parts I, II and III, all following the Preamble. Thus, 
the Preamble opens with: "The States Parties to the present 
Convention." It then presents in thirteen separate paragraphs 
the motivating considerations and relevant doctrinal back-
ground.l1 The Preamble then concludes with "[the States Par-
ties] have agreed as follows:." 
The format of the Preamble, therefore, leaves little doubt 
that the agreement, the binding legal duties, is intended to 
appear in that part of the document following the Preamble. In 
addition, the preambular text does not purport to contain a 
legal right of a fetus to be born. Its wording is unambiguous in 
the sense that it would merely oblige States Parties to provide 
appropriate legal protection before birth, but it leaves to each 
State Party the determination of what is appropriate. 12 As a 
matter of syntax, the "appropriate" limitation applies only to 
the "legal protection" referred to in Paragraph 9. This perhaps 
implies that other actions - special safeguards and care - for 
11. These preambular paragraphs include, in addition to the Ninth discussed 
in the text, such motivating forces as: 
Bearing in mind that the peoples of the United Nations 
have, in the Charter, reaffirmed their faith in fundamen-
tal human rights and in the dignity and worth of the 
human person, and have determined to promote social 
progress and better standards of life in larger freedom. 
(Paragraph 2). 
Recalling that, in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, the United Nations has proclaimed that childhood 
is entitled to special care and assistance. (Paragraph 4). 
Recognizing the importance of international co-operation 
for improving the living conditions of children in every 
country, in particular in the developing countries. (Para-
graph 13). 
12. See Philip Alston, The Unborn Child and Abortion under the Draft Conven-
tion on the Rights of the Child, 12 HUM. RTS. Q. 156 n.1 (1990). 
5
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the unborn cannot be limited to what a State deems appropri-
ate. These latter actions, however, are phrased in sufficient 
generality and breadth so as to afford each State a degree of 
discretion that is at least as broad as that conveyed by the 
reference to what is appropriate. 
B. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPH 9 
The second compelling reason why the key reference in 
Paragraph 9 to legal protection before as well as after birth 
does not create any legal rights or duties relating to the un-
born relates to understanding the derivation of the reference. 
The phrase appears within quotation marks in the Preamble 
because it is, as the text indicates, taken from the 1959 United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of the Child. 13 
That Declaration had been drafted by the United Nations 
Human Rights Commission and submitted to the General 
Assembly's Third (Social, Humanitarian and Cultural) Com-
mittee for its approval prior to being put before the Assembly 
as a whole. 14 The Commission's draft included a paragraph in 
its Preamble affirming that "the child needs special safe-
guards, including special legal protection, by reason of his 
physical and mental immaturity." Consideration of this text 
included discussion of an amendment proposed by Italy that 
would have recognized a need for the legal protection at the 
earliest point in time in a pregnancy.15 Italy would have add-
ed to the Commission's draft a phrase declaring that "child-re-
quired" safeguards and protection "from the moment of his con-
ception."16 The amendment was rejected, however, upon the 
objection by several delegations that it would be unacceptable 
in countries where abortion was permitted under certain cir-
cumstances 17. 
13. GoA Res. 1386, U.N. GAOR, 14th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 19, U.N. Doc. 
Al4354 (1959). 
14. Summary of deliberations and decisions in the Third Committee, 1959 
U.N.Y.B. 193, U.N. Sales No. E.80.II.C.1 (1959). 
15. Id.. 
16. Id .. 
17. Id .. 
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This same issue was raised a second time in the Third 
Committee's consideration of the draft Declaration, but this 
time in a form that would have elevated the significance of 
pre-birth protection beyond what it would have had in the 
Preamble. Italy and five other countries proposed a new Princi-
ple be added to the body of the Declaration which would state 
that the child's right to life should be respected from the mo-
ment of conception. This too, however, was rejected. The Phil-
ippines offered a compromise that deleted reference to the time 
of conception. It contained the phrase ''before as well as after 
birth" which Paragraph 9 of the Preamble to the Convention 
quoted and was accepted in the Third Committee, but not as 
one of the Principles of the Declaration. Instead it became the 
third paragraph of the Declaration's Preamble. As framed the 
text was approved by 70 votes to 0, with two abstentions. The 
General Assembly then adopted it unanimously. 
It is thus clear that "appropriate legal protection, before as 
well as after birth," in its original incarnation in international 
instruments, was purposefully vague on the question of when 
before birth the legal protection arises. The legislative history 
of the Declaration on the Rights of the Child reveals a firm 
rejection of the idea that fetal protection from the time of con-
ception was appropriate as an international aspiration. 
It should be noted, moreover, that while the Declaration, 
in common with General Assembly resolutions generally, is a 
manifesto document, it does not, by its own force, constitute 
international law. The fact that the phrase in question occurs 
in the Preamble to the Declaration makes that phrase still 
further removed from an international legal obligation. It ap-
pears as one of the "whereas" paragraphs identifying consider-
ations that subsequently moved the General Assembly in the 
document to call upon the world to recognize the ten stated 
Principles (not the Preamble) and to strive to observe them. 
The anti-abortion nations had similarly failed to achieve 
international law protection for the unborn as early as the 
drafting of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights18 
18. See, Alston, supra note 12, at 159. 
7
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and again in the writing of the Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights. 19 
The one possible exception to these developments is Article 
4(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights which pro-
vides: "Every person has the right to have his life respected. 
This right shall be protected by law and, in general from the 
moment of conception."20 Even Article 4(1) of the American 
Convention does not, however, rigidly proscribe abortions be-
19. See Yoram Dinstein, The Right to Life, Physical Integrity, and Liberty, in 
THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS 114, 122 (Louis Henkin, ed., 1981). 
The Human Rights Committee, established under Article 28 of the Cove-
nant, has never considered the right to life protected by the Covenant's Article 6 
to include protection of the unborn, even when it exhorted States Parties to broad-
ly interpret the right: 
[T]he Committee has noted that the right to life has been 
too often narrowly interpreted. The expression "inherent 
right to life" cannot properly be understood in a restric-
tive manner, and the protection of this right requires that 
States adopt positive measures. In this connection, the 
Committee considers that it would be desirable for States 
Parties to take all possible measures to reduce infant 
mortality and to increase life expectancy, especially in 
adopting measures to eliminate malnutrition and epidem-
ics. 
General Comments Under Article 40, Paragraph 4, of the Covenant, U.N. GAOR, 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Hum. Rts. Comm., at 2, U.N. 
Doc. CCPR/C/21lAdd.l (1981). 
A recent study of the work of the Human Rights Committee, the monitoring 
group established under the Covenant, concludes: 
Abortion and euthenasia have only been spasmodically 
dealt with by HRC members. The ICCPR contains no ex-
press provision concerning the points in time at which life 
commences and terminates and thus the precise extent of 
a State's obligation is uncertain. Draft proposals that 
would have covered a right to life "from conception" were 
not adopted. A number of HRC members have commented 
that the question of abortion was peculiarly moral and 
controversial one and that it would therefore be difficult 
to achieve a Committee view on it. . . . When dealing 
with the question of abortion, the principal concern of the 
members has been to determine the circumstances in 
which abortions were authorized. This could be taken to 
suggest that abortions are not per se contrary to the 
ICCPR or at least that they might be compatible with the 
ICCPR in certain circumstances. 
D. MCGoLDRICK, THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE 330 (1994). 
20. O.AS. Treaty Series No. 36, at 1, OEAlSer. L.N1I1.23 doc. rev. 2, entered 
into force July 18, 1978. 
8
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cause the reference to "in general" has been interpreted to pro-
vide a degree of discretion in States Parties to the American 
Convention,21 one that is similar to that which is safeguarded 
by inclusion of the term "appropriate" in preambular para-
graph 9 of the Convention.22 
Human rights regimes established under other major re-
gional instruments produce a similar result. Both the Europe-
an23 and African24 conventions on human rights protect a 
right to life without any reference to the unborn.25 
This being the posture of the international community on 
the issue, Poland submitted the original draft of a Convention 
on the Rights of the Child to the UN Human Rights Commis-
sion in 1978.26 This submission included a preambular para-
, 
21. The Baby Boy Case, Case 2141, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 25, OEAlser. LN .111.54, 
doc.9 re.l (1981) reprinted in 2 HUM. RTS. L.J. 110 (1981). 
22. See Alston, supra note 12, at 175·77, noting that: 
The American Convention, and the interpretation which it 
has been given by the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights, are significant in the present context 
because they confirm the consistent refusal of internation-
al law, even in the case of a treaty which specifically 
recognizes the right to life, " . . . in general, from the 
moment of conception," to impinge significantly on the 
discretion of each state to adopt its own policy regulating 
access to abortion. 
23. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, art. 2(1), 213 U.N.T.S. 222, entered into force Sept. 3, 1953. 
24. African [Banjul] Charter on Human and People's Rights, Article 4, OAU. 
Doc. CABlLEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982), entered into force Oct. 21, 1986. 
25. In Austria, where the European Convention supra note 23, has constitu-
tional status, the Constitutional Court has refused to interpret Article 2 as pro-
tecting unborn life. The case is discussed in Brenda, The Impact of Constitutional 
Law on the Protection of Unborn Human Life: Some Comparative Remarks, 6 HUM. 
RTS. L.J. 223, 234-35 (1977). Alston observes that, similarly, "the European Com-
mission on Human Rights has consistently refused to accept that the right to life 
recognized in the European Convention of Human Rights can be translated into an 
absolute right for an unborn child." Alston, supra note 12, at 174. 
26. U.N. ESCOR, 1978, Supp. No.4, at 122-27, U.N. Doc. ElI978134; ElCN.-
411292 (1978). (Literal reiteration of the 1959 Declaration on the Rights of the 
Child, supra note 13, at 19-20, with added clauses appropriate for a multilateral 
treaty). The Secretary General circulated this Declaration for comments and sug-
gestions to member States. QUESTION OF A CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE 
CHILD; REPORT OF THE SECRETARy-GENERAL [REPLIES RECEIVED FROM GoVERN-
MENTS AND ORGANIZATIONS], U.N. ESCOR, Commission on Hum. Rts., U.N. Doc. 
ElCN.411324; U.N. Doc. ElCN.4113241Corr.l; U.N. Doc. ElCN.4113241Add.I-5 (1978) 
[hereinafter REpLIES RECEIVED FROM GoVERNMENTS AND ORGANIZATIONS]. 
9
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graph that repeated the reference in the preamble of the Dec-
laration relating to protection of the child before as well as 
after birth, relying for support on reference to a number of 
international instruments.27 The request for comments on the 
Polish draft28 from the international community produced on-
ly a few responses to this part of the draft and "[t]he most 
striking feature of the initial responses then was the paucity of 
concern with the issue, which would seem to demonstrate a 
generally shared, but certainly unstated, consensus that the 
matter would be best left unaddressed or at least unre-
solved."29 Poland then reformulated its draft, this time omit-
ting any reference to the unborn in the revised preamble and 
vesting the protection of the Convention in a child defined as 
existing "from the moment of his birth. "30 
The issue of provision for fetal rights in the Preamble did 
arise, however, shortly after the Working Group organized by 
the Commission to produce .a final draft of the Convention 
began its work.31 By 1980, the Working Group had adopted a 
text of the first four preambular paragraphs. At its second 
In light of the strongly' expressed views of responding states that the vague 
and general language of the Declaration was inappropriate for a legally binding 
treaty, Poland submitted a revised text which became the starting point for the 
Working Group's efforts for the next ten years. See, QUESTION OF A CONVENTION 
ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CmLD; NOTE VERBIjLE DATED 5 OCT. 1979 ADDRESSED TO 
THE DMSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS By THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATION OF THE 
POLISH PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC TO THE UNITED NATIONS IN GENEVA, U.N. ESCOR, 
COMMISSION ON HUM. RTS., U.N. Doc. ElCN.411349 (1980) [hereinafter POLISH 
DRAFT]. 
27. The 1978 Polish draft refers to the Geneva Declaration of the Rights of 
the Child of 1924; the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights; and "the statutes of specialized agencies and interna-
tional organizations concerned with the welfare of children." As Professor Alston's 
analysis of these instruments demonstrates, however, none of these texts supply 
authority for the Polish draft. Alston, supra note 12, at 158-59. 
28. See REpLIES FROM GoVERNMENTS AND ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 26. 
29. Alston, supra note 12, at 162. 
30. POLISH DRAFT, supra note 26; See also discussion of Art. 1 infra part IV. 
31. QUESTION OF A CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE Cmw; REPORT OF 
THE WORKING GROUP ANNEX. PARAGRAPHS OF THE DRAFT CONVENTION ON THE 
RIGHTS OF THE Cmw ADOPTED BY THE WORKING GROUP, U.N. ESCOR, Commis-
sion on Hum. Rts. - Working Group, UN Doc. ElCN.4IL.1542 (1980) (summary of 
events at the 1980 meeting of the Working Group from that year's Working Group 
report). 
10
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meeting that year the Holy See and several other delegations 
proposed that the preambular paragraph to be considered next 
for adoption include a reference to the child's need for care and 
assistance "before as well as after birth," a phrase proponents 
of the amendment acknowledged they had taken from the 
Preamble to the 1959 Declaration on the Rights of the Child.32 
Supporters of this proposal argued that it was not designed to 
preclude the possibility of abortion33 and that rights before 
birth were commonly protected in national legislation, citing 
inheritance rights of the unborn as an example of the need for 
pre-birth protection.34 Opponents, on the other hand, insisted 
that it was important that the Convention be clearly neutral 
on the issue of abortion and that a tilt one way or the other 
would, in light of differing domestic policies on abortion, en-
danger widespread ratification.35 The consensus of the delega-
tions favored the opposition's view and the proposed reference 
to protection before birth was not accepted. These discussions 
in the 1980 Working Group retraced the controversy that had 
arisen in the course of adopting the original 1959 Declaration 
and reached the same result of rejecting a partisan position on 
the abortion issue. 
In subsequent meetings of the Working Group the matter 
of referring to fetal rights in the Preamble remained dormant 
until near the completion of the drafting. From 1980 to 1989 
the Working Group gradually adopted the full text of the draft 
Convention without the issue of a preambular mention of pre-
birth rights again arising. The 1989 meeting of the Working 
Group was devoted to a second reading of the draft produced 
during this period. At that meeting, however, two proposed 
amendments concerning the existing sixth preambular para-
graph36 again sought to add the "before as well as after birth" 
phrase from the Preamble to the 1959 Declaration.37 The rep-
32. [d. at 2. 
33. [d .. 
34. [d. at 3. 
35. [d .. 
36. This was the same text that had been the fifth preambular paragraph in 
1980 and which became the ninth paragraph in the final fonn of the Convention. 
37. The Federal Republic of Germany submitted one amendment; U.N. Doc. 
ElCN.411989/WG.lIWP.6. The Philippines, Ireland, Malta and the Holy See jointly 
submitted the other. UN Doc. ElCN.411989/WG.1IWP.8. The latter was withdrawn 
by its sponsors in the course of the discussion of the former. Report of the Work-
11
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resentative of the Federal Republic of Germany introduced this 
amendment by explaining that in the Bundestag his govern-
ment had been asked why the first draft of the Convention had 
not included protection for the unborn and that his government 
had no good reasons to present.3S He added that without his 
amendment the draft would not be acceptable to his govern-
ment.39 
Discussions of the FRG proposal then largely repeated the 
1959 and the 1980 deliberations concerning the Preamble. The 
representative of Poland pointed out that the existing draft did 
not preclude a State Party from protecting the unborn and that 
Article 21 of the draft convention invited a broad interpreta-
tion of the text.40 This time, however, the proponents insisted 
on inclusion of their reference to the unborn. The West Ger-
man delegate indicated that he would formally request a vote 
on his proposal if the text of the Preamble did not reflect it. 
Norway, with the on-the-record support of a number of other 
delegations,41 opposed reopening the 1959 and 1980 debates. 
ing Group on a Draft Convention on the Rights of the Child. U.N. Doc. 
ElCN.411989/48 at 9 (hereinafter Report of the Working Group). 
38. The remarks by the FRG delegate appear in the notes of the author who 
attended that meeting as a representative of one of the non-governmental organi-
zations participating in the drafting sessions, Defense for Children International. 
The remarks do not appear in the official Report of the Working Group, supra note 
37. At no point in the discussion that followed did the Federal RepUblic's repre-
sentative indicate why his government had not responded to the parliamentary 
inquiries. He simply cited the 1980 failure to obtain inclusion of a preambular 
reference to the unborn and the similar failure in regard to the defInition of 
"child". See discussion infra Part IV. For other curious aspects of the West Ger-
man position, See, Alston, supra note 12, at 171-72. 
39. Report of the Working Group, supra note 37. 
40. [d. at 10. This caused some confusion because during the entire previous 
ten years of drafting, all provisions of the draft had been accepted by consensus 
and without the necessity of voting. The representative of the UN Secretariat 
indicated that it was unclear which delegations in the room were entitled to vote 
and that the UN headquarters in New York would have to be consulted. See su-
pra text accompanying note 36. 
41. The other delegations included those from the the Netherlands, India, 
France, China, the USSR, Denmark, Sweden, the German Democratic Republic and 
Canada. The Norwegian delegation was particularly reluctant to reopen a debate 
without there being anything new to discuss. The United States representative 
noted that a fetus is not a person under the federal constitution but that state 
laws offered some degree of protection. His opinion was that the West German 
proposal was flexible enough to comport with United States law but, like the Nor-
wegian representative, he was afraid that reopening the issue would consume 
12
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Announcing that a vote would be taken the next day, the 
Chairman of the Working Group appointed a small drafting 
group to try to find a text that would command a consensus 
and thereby avoid the divisiveness of a recorded vote.42 The 
appointed group accepted the proposal to include the reference 
to the unborn. Its recommendation became the ninth 
preambular paragraph of the Convention. It differed from the 
Federal Republic's proposal only in that the introductory 
phrase - "Bearing in mind" now in the Convention - was substi-
~uted for the "Recognizing" originally in the German text.43 
The result of these events was to carry forward into the 
Preamble of the Convention the same indeterminancy and 
refusal to take a clear position on the abortion issue that had 
last appeared in 1959. 
IV. ARTICLE 1: THE DEFINITION OF "CIDLD" 
In light of the long-standing global consensus, outlined in 
Part III supra, that it is inappropriate for international law, or 
even formal international aspiration, to take a position for or 
against fetal or abortion rights, it is no surprise that the sub-
stantive parts of the Convention, including the key definition 
of "child" in Article 1, reflect the same position of neutrality. 
The drafting history of Article 1 demonstrates this. 
more time than was available to the Working Group. There was no dissent from 
any source to the position that, as the text stood, States Parties could go their 
separate ways on the question of legal protection for the fetus. Report of the Work-
ing Group, supra note 37. 
42. The drafting group was composed of the representatives of the Federal Re-
public of Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Italy, Poland, the United States and 
Sweden. Report of the Working Group, supra note 37, at 11. 
43. The drafting group also proposed the addition of a text to the travaux 
preparatoires relating to the Convention's definition of "child". This was to insure 
that its modification of the Preamble did not implicitly create fetal rights in Part 
I of the Convention. See discussion infra part IV. There was also "corridor" talk 
that proponents of the adopted preambular amendment had also undertaken not to 
introduce any amendments to the text of Part I designed to insure substantive 
rights for the unborn. This is impossible to confirm, but no such amendments 
were, in fact, put forward. The two pending amendments that would have extend-
ed the Convention's protections from conception were withdrawn upon adoption of 
the preambular reference to the 1959 Declaration. See text to note 47 infra. 
13
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The 1979 revised Polish draft included a definition of 
"child" which would have had childhood commence "from the 
moment of his birth"." Two now familiar perspectives 
emerged in the Working Group's initial discussions of that 
definition in 1980. One asserted that the draft being consid-
ered was contrary to the legislation in many countries which 
extended the concept of childhood back to the moment of con-
ception.45 Opponents of this view argued that there should be 
no attempt to establish precisely when childhood begins in 
order that the definition be compatible with the heterogeneity 
of existing domestic legislation.46 This latter result was ac-
complished by deleting the phrase "from the moment of his 
birth". In that form the definition was adopted . 
. At the second reading of the draft Convention in 1989 -
the same meeting that produced Preambular Paragraph 9 - the 
definitional issue arose again. Two proposals for amending the 
definition of "child" were before the Working Group that would 
have had childhood begin at conception.47 The FRG proposal 
for amending the Preamble in the same direction was pending 
at the same time and discussed first. Upon resolution of the 
preambular issue, the sponsors of the Article 1 amendments 
stated that, in light of the just-adopted text of preambular 
paragraph 6 referring to protection before as well as after 
birth, their amendments would be withdrawn. They added that 
they wished the report of the Working Group to show that 
their governments took the view that protection of the child 
began with conception.48 
44. POLISH DRAFT, supra note 26. (The 1959 Declaration of the Rights of the 
Child did not include a defInition of "child".) 
45. Supra note 26, at 5. 
46.ld .. 
47. U.N. Doc. ElCN.411989/WG.1lWP.9 (submitted by Malta); U.N. Doc. 
ElCN.411989/WG.1lWP.17 (submitted by Senegal). 
48. Report of the Working Group, supra note 37, at 15-16. This is also the 
view of Senator Jesse Helms, but it is not shared by the Senate as a whole. Sena-
tor Helms attempted to have the Senate resolution urging President Bush to sign 
the Convention amended to add a definition of child which included the unborn 
offspring of any human being at every stage of development, but the amendment 
was rejected by a vote of 63-36. 52 CONGo REc., S12787 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 1990). 
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The relationship between the existing preambular para-
graph 6 and the definition of Child in Article 1 was a cause of 
concern to some delegations who feared that the preambular 
reference to the unborn would influence interpretion of the 
definition and other substantive provisions of the Convention. 
As an expression of this concern the Chairman's ad hoc draft-
ing group which had written the text of preambular paragraph 
9 urged that the Chairman include, on behalf of the entire 
Working Group, the following text in the trauaux preparatoires. 
In adopting this preambular paragraph, the 
Working Group does not intend to prejudice the 
interpretation of article 1 or any other provision 
of the Convention by States Parties.49 
The Chairman then read this statement into the record. 
This maneuver needs to be understood in the context of Article 
31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,50 which 
provides that the terms of a treaty are to be interpreted in 
their context, and that "context" includes the preamble of the 
treaty. 51 The United Kingdom's representative requested that 
the U.N.'s Legal Counsel be formally asked to confirm that the 
Chairman's statement would be deemed relevant if there were 
any future doubts concerning the interpretation of the defini-
tion of "child".52 One possible explanation for this was appre-
hension that the reference to protection for the unborn in 
preambular paragraph 9 would lead to the interpretation of 
the Article 1 definition of "child" as including the unborn. 
While awaiting the response of Legal Counsel, the U. K dele-
gate indicated that his government might have to lodge a res-
ervation concerning Article 1 at the time of ratification. 53 
49. Report of the Working Group, supra note 37, at 11. 
50. See supra note 9. 
51. The representative of Ireland questioned the appropriateness of including 
the statement in the official report, but neither he nor any other delegate lodged a 
formal objection. Report of the Working Group, supra note 37, at 143. 
52. [d. at 11. 
53. [d. at 7. The U.K signed the Convention on April 19, 1990, reserving the 
right to formulate reservations or declarations upon ratification. Reservations, Dec· 
larations, and Objections, supra note 1, at 26. When the United Kingdom did 
ratify in December, 1991, it included among its reservations and declarations a 
statement that: "The United Kingdom interprets the Convention as applicable only 
following a live birth." [d. 
15
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Shortly after the Working Group concluded its first week 
of deliberations at the 1989 session, Legal Counsel sent a reply 
which made two points. He indicated that there was no prohi-
bition in law or practice against including an interpretative 
statement in the trauaux preparatoires. 54 He however also 
found it "strange" that the Working Group sought to deprive a 
preambular paragraph of its usual role in providing a basis for 
interpreting the terms of the treaty. This "deprivation" would 
make it difficult to determine which conclusions a State would 
later draw in seeking to interpret the treaty. 55 
Legal Counsel also reminded the Working Group that, in 
any event, under Article 32 of the Vienna Convention recourse 
could be had to the trauaux preparatoires only if those inter-
preting the treaty found its relevant terms to be unclear66• On 
this point Counsel may have been suggesting that the state-
ment inserted in the record at the request of the ad hoc work-
ing group would be of importance and accessible as an aid for 
interpretation only if other parts of the Convention were un-
clear. This view misconstrues what had occured in Geneva. 
The purpose of the inserted statement was not to provide 
meaning for unclear terms. Its aim was precisely for the 
"strange" reason noted by Counsel, namely, to deprive the 
phrase in Preambular Paragraph 9 of its normal impact as a 
source for interpretation. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention 
confirms that it normally is such a source.57 Moreover, Article 
31 does not make the preamble available as an interpretive 
source only for unclear parts of the Convention. It is rather a 
part of the textual context out of which the ordinary meaning 
of all terms is primarily derived. 
54. Response of the Legal Counsel to the Request for Confirmation by the Rep· 
resentative of the United Kingdom regarding Preambular Paragraph 6 (paragraph 
9), Report of the Working Group, supra note 37, at 144. 
55. [d .. Alston points out that Legal Counsel misconstrued the purpose of the 
statement inserted in the travaux and failed to understand that it was part of the 
compromise in the ad hoc drafting group designed to prevent any effort to mis-
represent the significance of the agreed to preambular paragraph. Alston, supra 
note 12, at 171. 
56. Response of the Legal Counsel, supra note 54. The terms used in Article 
32(a) of the Vienna Convention to identify the lack of clarity are "ambiguous or 
obscure." 
57. Supra note 9. 
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That may be the ordinary role of the preamble assigned to 
it by the Vienna Convention, but ordinary agreement of States 
Parties to a treaty can modify it. 58 That modification is the 
result intended to be achieved by the statement inserted in the 
record. 
Thus, in reviewing these developments one non-govern-
mental organization present at the Working Group meeting 
appropriately concluded: 
The unborn child is currently not protected as 
far as the draft convention on the rights of the 
child is concerned. The insertion of a reference 
to the child "before as well as after birth" in the 
sixth preambular paragraph is in fact negated 
by a statement which was placed in the record 
of the meeting (trauaux preparatoires), indicat-
ing the intention of the working group which 
drafted the present text of the convention.59 
This legislative history of Article 1 simply narrates once 
again the consensus of the international community that the 
legal protection of fetal rights is not an appropriate subject for 
international legislation. 
V. ARTICLE 6: THE RIGHT TO LIFE AND SURVIVAL 
Since the debate in the United States on the abortion 
question is often framed in terms of a "right to life," the rele-
vance of the Article 6(1) proclamation of an "inherent right to 
life" - reiterated and reinforced by an obligation to ensure 
"survival" imposed by the second paragraph of Article 6 - is 
readily apparent. 
58. There is no basis for suggesting that the rules relating to the role of a 
convention's preamble are of a jus cogens status and cannot, therefore, be modified 
by a normal agreement. 
59. QUESTION OF A CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD; WRlTI'EN 
STATEMENTS BY THE INTERNATIONAL RIGHT TO LIFE FEDERATION, U.N. ESCOR, 
Comm. on Hum. Rts. at I, U.N. Doc. ElCN.411989INGO/55 (1989). 
17
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Article 6 (then Article 1 bis) was adopted late in the ten 
year drafting process. It developed out of a proposal by India 
designed to ensure "the survival and healthy development of 
the child. "60 Amid expressions of concern that the idea of sur-
vival was not a common legal term, the observer for UNICEF 
at the Working Group explained what the term meant in that 
agency.61 The record does not reflect the UNICEF explanation 
made at that time. The next year the representative of the 
World Health Organization placed into the record a meaning of 
the term. He informed the Working Group that: 
[T]he term "survival" had a special meaning 
within the United Nations context, especially for 
[WHO] and UNICEF. "Survival" included 
growth monitoring, oral rehydration and disease 
control, breast feeding, immunization, child 
spacing, food and female literacy.62 
In the context of a right to survival with such a meaning, 
the discussions developed the idea that the right to survival 
and a right to life were complementary and mutually support-
ing expressions.63 It was also pointed out in the discussion of 
this part of the draft that the Working Group had agreed not 
to reopen the question of when life begins.64 The Chairman 
suggested that the Indian proposal was designed to remedy the 
absence from the. draft of a right to life, a right that was al-
ready enshrined in Article 6(1) of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights.65 Perhaps he was then recalling 
that anti-abortion nations had failed in their efforts to have 
Article 6 of the Civil and Political Covenant include the phrase 
"from the moment of conception" in the proclamation of a right 
to life.66 He did add that the Covenant's right was primarily 
negative. This apparently meant that it served to prohibit 
60. UN Doc. ElCN.411988/WG.1IWP.13 (1988). 
61. Question of A Convention on the Rights of the Child; Report of the Working 
Group on a Draft Convention on the Rights of the Child, U.N. ESCOR, Comm. on 
Hum. Rts., at 6, U.N. Doc. ElCN.411988/28 (1988). 
62. Report of the Working Group, supra note 37, at 17. 
63. Id .. 
64. Id .. 
65. G.A Res. 2200A, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. 
Al6316 (1966); 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976). 
66. See supra text accompanying notes 14-17. 
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uDlawful exaction of life by the state,67 while the right to life 
that belonged in the Convention "should be positive and should 
take into account economic, social and cultural conditions. rn;s 
Writing a text that would express the themes of the discussion 
became the responsibility of a small drafting group appointed 
by the Chairman.69 It produced a text adopted by the Working 
Group in what was later described as "a spirit of collabora-
tion.,,70 The representative of Venezuela expressed a dissatis-
faction with the second paragraph of the drafting group's sub-
mission on the grounds that it "diminished" the right to life al-
ready conferred by international law.71 The Holy See's repre-
sentative responded by declaring that the Holy See recognized 
the rights of a child from the moment of conception.72 This 
latter observation elicited no comments from any other delega-
tion, and throughout the Working Group's further discussions 
of this draft article all the other delegates abided by the earlier 
noted agreement not to reopen the issue of rights for the un-
born. 
Despite the verbal similarity between the international 
right to life and the statements of anti-abortion groups, there 
is no reason to believe that the Working Group that adopted 
Article 6 in its draft Convention intended to recognize a right 
to life that had anything to do with protecting the unborn. 
There is much reason to believe that the delegations responsi-
ble for the drafting intentionally avoided having Article 6 ad-
dress the abortion question. There is only a semantic similari-
ty. The time when the life begins for which Article 6 provides a 
right was left in the same condition of indeterminacy as the 
question of whether a human being comes into existence at 
conception for purposes of the Article 1 definition of "child". 
67. See McGoldrick, op. cit. supra note 19 at 328-61. 
68. Report of the Working Group, supra note 37, at 7. 
69. Composed of Argentina, Bulgaria, India, Italy, Norway, UNICEF and the 
United Kingdom. [d .. 
70. Report of the Working Group, supra note 37, at 17. 
71. [d .. 
72. [d .. 
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VI. RECOURSE TO THE PREPARATORY WORK 
As noted at the outset, an appreciation of the Convention's 
legislative history is critical to understanding its meaning. In 
international law, the Vienna Convention governs access to the 
history of a treaty.73 It is important, therefore, to verify that 
it is permissible to rely on meanings that depend on recourse 
to the trauaux. 
In regard to the Preamble, its meaning and impact do not 
depend on reviewing the trauaux. The fact that the Preamble 
does not create rights and duties follows from the plain and 
ordinary meaning of the preambular text and from its role in 
conventional law. The background material for the key phrase 
in Preambular Paragraph 9 was included in the text of Part 
III, supra, to demonstrate that its presence in the treaty be-
speaks no international consensus either way on the abortion 
issue. 
The Preamble does however generally provide a source for 
interpreting unclear parts of the Convention. It has earlier 
been suggested that this general effect has been negated con-
cerning the reference to protection of the unborn in the Pream-
ble. However, this particular conclusion has been achieved by 
an action reflected solely in the trauaux, not by any express 
agreement included in the treaty. Thus, the question arises of 
whether the Vienna Convention permits recourse to the 
trauaux for the purpose of altering the otherwise applicable 
impact of the Vienna Convention. The function of Articles 31 
and 32 provides the answer. These articles serve to restrict 
altering the ordinary meaning of treaty terms by use of supple-
mentary material such as the trauaux. When ordinary meaning 
is not at issue, however, e.g. when the question relates to the 
role and impact of the Preamble rather than its semantic sig-
nificance, the Vienna Convention erects no such barrier. In 
fact, there was little alternative to achieving the desired result 
in this fashion. If it appeared strange to withhold the impact of 
Preambular Pargraph 9 via a statement in the trauaux, it 
73. Supra note 9. 
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would have been stranger still to seek the same objective via a 
formal agreement in the body of the treaty. 
The matter of recourse to the trauaux is a bit more compli-
cated regarding Articles 1 and 6 of the Convention. Here the 
key inquiry is certainly a search for meaning. The limiting 
impact of Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention needs to 
taken into account. 
The two substantive prOVISIOns possibly affected by 
Preambular Paragraph 9 are the reference to a "human being" 
in the Article 1 definition of "child" and the absence of a specif-
ic time for when life begins in the Article 6 provision on right 
to life. The examination of the trauaux preparatoires undertak~ 
en above in Parts IV and V indicates that the drafters of the 
Convention continuously and successfully resisted attempts to 
have these two articles reflect an affirmative response to the 
question of whether "human being" includes the unborn and to 
whether there is a right to life before birth. Does the Vienna 
Convention allow the trauaux as an available source for discov-
ering this? 
The first step in arriving at an answer is to determine if, 
in regard to the definition of ''human being," there is an ordi-
nary meaning derived from an examination of the context in 
which it appears. If there is, the Vienna Convention dictates 
that this is the meaning it has in the treaty and that generally 
such an ordinary meaning cannot be modified by resort to the 
trauaux. Although Article 31 of the Vienna Convention states 
that the context involved in seeking ordinary meaning includes 
the treaty's preamble, for reasons indicated supra, in this in-
stance Preambular Paragraph 9 is not part of the context. It is 
the ordinary meaning of "human being" that must be sought 
without regard to the wording of the Preamble about protec-
tion for the unborn. Two possibilities present themselves. 
One is that the ordinary meaning of "human being" does 
include the unborn. This alternative would then have the un-
born protected by all the rights in the Convention, such as the 
21
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right to a free and compulsory education,74 the right to be no-
tified if his or her father is arrested,75 and the right to ex-
press his or her opinion.76 These are manifestly absurd and 
unreasonable results, a view contemplated by Article 32 of the 
Vienna Convention which permits recourse to the trauaux in 
order to arrive at a more sensible meaning.77 
This would suggest that interpretation is open unless 
there is no absurdity or unreasonableness because the Conven-
tion contemplates and invites a discriminating application of 
some rights to the unborn, e.g. the right to life or the right to 
health care, yet withholds others, such as those just men-
tioned. This is plainly not the case. There is nothing in the text 
to support this interpretation. It is not acceptable to believe 
that the document represents a gross violation of a cardinal 
rule of drafting, namely that a word should have a single con-
sistent meaning each time it is used and that if a different 
meaning is intended, a different word must be used. This is 
especially true when the particular word is as crucial to the 
document as the word "child" is to the Convention. It is still 
more true when the word is the subject of a definitional sec-
tion. 
In addition, the text of the Convention indicates that when 
its application does depend on age or stage of development of 
the child, specific mention is made of that expectation. 78 
Therefore, if "human being" includes the unborn, the results 
become manifestly absurd and unreasonable - the trauaux 
becomes available, revealing an intention not to have the trea-
ty include substantive rights for the unborn. The Convention 
does not oblige States Parties to accord those rights, although 
74. Supra note 4, Article 28. 
75. Id. at Article 9(4). 
76. Id. at Article 12(1). 
77. Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation. This in· 
cludes the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion 
in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of Article 31. Such 
recourse also covers determination of the meaning according to Article 31 when 
intepreting: (a) to leave the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or (b) leads to a result 
which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable (emphasis added). Vienna Convention, 
supra note 9, (Article 32). 
78. See, e.g., Articles 12 and 14. 
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there is nothing in the Convention that would prevent them 
from extending some or all of the conventional rights to the 
unborn, if they are so inclined. 
The second alternative, ordinary meaning of "human be-
ing" is the opposite of the first. i.e. the term does not include 
the unborn. That meaning may conflict with an anti-abortion 
position, but it produces no manifesly absurd or unreasonable 
results anywhere in the rest of the treaty. The Vienna Conven-
tion requires therefore that this be the meaning of the term for 
purposes of the Convention. It cannot be altered by reference 
to supplementary material which, in any case, would simply 
confIrm that the drafters of the Convention refused to provide 
substantive rights for the unborn. 
Resolution of the question as it relates to the right to life 
in Article 6 of the Convention requires little further elabora-
tion. This is a right that belongs to a "child" who, as suggested, 
is a human being under the age of 18 who has been born. In 
this Convention it cannot be a right to be born. 
The issue would be resolved in a similar fashion under 
domestic law of the United States. The Supreme Court has 
made clear that when it is necessary to ascertain the meaning 
of a treaty, the preparatory work may be consulted.79 In fact, 
it is difficult to anticipate that anyone interested in deriving 
an answer to the question examined in this paper would studi-
ously ignore the travaux. 
The response of courts at the international level has been 
to accept the travaux if the treaty itself is unclear, leading 
McNair to note, concerning the initial decision of whether the 
treaty is in fact unclear for these purposes, that: "[I]t is clear 
in numerous cases that before making such an announcement 
the court has in fact considered the preparatory work."80 
79. Nielsen v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 47, 52 (1929) ("When their [treaties'] meaning 
is uncertain, recourse may be had to the negotiations and diplomatic correspon-
dence of the contracting parties relating to the subject matter and to their own 
practical construction of it." Id.). 
80. LoRD MCNAIR, THE LAw OF TREATIES 413 (1971). 
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VII. THE RESERVATIONS AND DECLARATIONS 
The lament of the right to life contingency that the Con-
vention "would allow each State to decide at what point the 
protection afforded by the convention should begin to apply -
even if that were to be from birth"81 accurately described the 
effect of the Convention as leaving intact domestic law con-
cerning whether and when pregnancies can be legally termi-
nated by abortion. It would also appear from their silence on 
the issue that nearly all of the 158 States Parties have accept-
ed the Convention as neutral on the abortion issue and, there-
fore, as creating no problems regarding their domestic law. 
They have seen no need to preserve their domestic law by 
accompanying their signature, ratification or accession with a 
formal preserving statement. 
A few States Parties, however, have chosen to elucidate 
their international legal duties on the abortion issue. An exam-
ination of the Declarations and Reservations that have accom-
panied signatures and ratifications to July 21, 1993, further 
confirms the heterogeneity of views on the abortion issue. In 
addition, it indicates that some States Parties deem it impor-
tant to put on the record the continuity of their relevant do-
mestic law. France, for example, accompanied both its signa-
ture and its ratification with the following Declaration: 
The Government of the French Republic declares 
that this Convention, particularly article 6, 
cannot be interpreted as constituting any obsta-
cle to the implementation of the provisions of 
French legislation relating to the voluntary in-
terruption of pregnancy.S2 
Argentina, Guatemala and Ecuador, on the other hand, 
included Declarations with their signatures that took the oppo-
site view and would accord Convention rights from concep-
tion.83 These statements were not repeated, however, when 
81. See supra text accompanying note 37. 
82. Report on the Sixth Session, supra note 6, at 15. Tunisia's ratification on 
January 30, 1992, contains a declaration that is almost a verbatim copy of the 
French one. [d. at 25. 
83. U.N. MULTILATERAL TREATIES 1995, at 191·95, U.N. Doc. STILEG/SER.ElI3, 
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the latter two ratified. The following Declaration concerning 
the definition in Article 1 accompanied ratification by Argenti-
na: 
Concerning article 1 of the Convention, the Ar-
gentine Republic declares that the article must 
be interpreted to the effect that a child means 
every human being from the moment of concep-
tion up to the age of eighteen.54 
The Holy See has continued to express its confidence that 
the position of Argentina will be broadly adopted,85 an expec-
tation that appears to have been partly frustrated by the 
ratifications of Ecuador and Guatemala. 
None of these statements has provoked an objection from 
another State Party. The pro-choice States appear to accept 
that international law after the Convention permits restriction 
on abortion. Anti-abortion States appear to find pro-choice 
policies not legally objectionable. 
Strong support has been expressed for having ratification 
by the United States qualified in terms similar to the French 
Declaration. At its 1994 mid-winter meeting the American Bar 
Association adopted a Resolution supporting ratification that 
would be accompanied by, inter alia, a Declaration that: 
This Convention imposes no legal obligations on 
the United States regarding the voluntary inter-
ruption of pregnancy and that this Convention 
cannot be interpreted as affecting laws in the 
United States relating to such interruptions.56 
U.N. Sales No. E.95.V.5 (1995). 
84. Report on the Sixth Session, supra note 6, at 10. 
85. "The Holy See remains confident that the ninth preambular paragraph will 
serve as the perspective through which the rest of the Convention will be inter-
preted, in conformity with Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties of 23 May 1969." [d. at 18. 
86. AMERICAN BAR AsSOCIATION RESOLUTIONS, RECOMMENDED RUD FOR 
THE UN CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD (Feb. 1994). 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
The aim of this paper has been to examine whether the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child would require the Unit-
ed States to protect the rights of the unborn resulting in a 
conflict with a constitutional right to privacy permiting a wom-
an to choose an abortion. Analysis of the drafting process, of 
previously expressed international perspectives on the ques-
tion, of relevant doctrines of international law, and of the re-
sponses of countries as they record their approval of the Con-
vention, all lead to the conclusion that the Convention does not 
pose any such conflict. Thus, the United States would be as 
free and sovereign to adopt policies on the abortion issue while 
a State Party to the Convention. A qualification similar to the 
one advanced by the American Bar Association easily resolves 
any residual doubt. 
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